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The Voting Rights Act Does Not Prevent
Preclearance When the Retrogressive Impact of a
Redistricting Plan Does Not Impair the Ability of
Minority Voters to Elect Candidates of Their
Choosing in Their District: Georgia v. Ashcroft
FEDERAL STATUTES - VOTING RIGHTS ACT - VOTER REDISTRICTING
PLANS - SECTION 5 PRECLEARANCE - The United States Supreme
Court ruled that a vote dilution violation under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act is not an independent reason to deny Section 5
preclearance when redrawing voting districts based on changes
stemming from the United States Census.
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).
In response to the 2000 national census, the Georgia General
Assembly set about the task of redrawing the borders of its voting
districts for the Georgia State Senate (hereinafter "State Senate"
or "Senate") to reflect changes in its population.! Since 1990, this
process in Georgia has been the subject of frequent litigation to
ensure the state's compliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act (hereinafter "VRA").2 Prior lawsuits had forced the presenta-
tion of multiple redistricting plans before an agreement could be
reached with the Department of Justice, which was subsequently
held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.3 The 2000 plan
1. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2003). The Georgia Constitution speci-
fies that "apportionment of the Senate and House of Representatitves shall be changed by
the General Assembly as necessary after each United States decennial census." GA. CONST.
art. 3, § 2, TI II.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2003). § 5 requires that before a covered jurisdiction's new vot-
ing standard, practice or procedure goes into effect, it must be precleared by either the
Attorney General of the United States or a federal court to ensure that the change "does
not have the purpose, and will not have the effect, of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color." Id. The purpose of this section is to forbid the modification of
voting procedures that would have a retrogressive effect on the abilities of minority voters
to elect candidates of their choosing. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
These obligations are applied to jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in their
electoral procedures. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2002). Georgia
was designated a covered jurisdiction by the Attorney General in 1965. Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995).
3. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2504-05. The 1990 redistricting plan increased the number
of majority-minority districts, but the Department of Justice refused preclearance because
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(hereinafter "plan") was an effort by the Democratic leadership of
the General Assembly to maintain the number of majority-
minority districts, while at the same time increasing the overall
number of Democratic Senate seats.4 The Senate adopted the plan
in August of 2001, with ten of the eleven black Senators, and
thirty-three of the thirty-four black Representatives voting in its
favor.5 The Governor signed the Senate plan into law, and the
state sought preclearance of the plan.6
Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, requesting a declaratory judgment that the
redistricting plan was in accord with Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act.7 It attempted to prove that its Senate plan was not
retrogressive in either its intent or effect.8 The United States ar-
gued that the 2001 Senate plan's changes to the boundaries of Dis-
tricts 2, 12, and 26 unlawfully reduced the ability of black voters
the plan did not contain a sufficient number of those districts. Id. at 2504. In 1992, the
Department of Justice granted preclearance to the State Senate's third redistricting plan,
only to have its congressional districting plan declared unconstitutional as racial gerry-
mandering in 1995 by the holding of Miller. Id. Another State Senate plan was passed in
1995, but this was found to artificially push the percentage of black voters within some
majority black districts as high as possible. Johnson v. Miller, 929 F. Supp. 1529, 1543
(S.D. Ga. 1996). After the Miller decision, Georgia passed a new plan in 1997 that re-
flected changes to accommodate the Court's ruling in Miller, and that of the district court in
Johnson. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2505. This 1997 plan set the stage for the litigation in this
case because it was in effect at the time of the 2001 redistricting. Id.
4. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2505. The Director of Georgia's Legislative Redistricting
Office testified that the Senate Black Caucus wanted to maintain the existing majority-
minority districts while at the same time not wasting black votes in landslide victories. Id.
at 2505-06. The intention of the plan was to create "influence districts" where black voters
would be able to exert a significant impact on the election process, rather than packing
them into minority-dominated districts. Id. at 2506. This plan established 13 additional
districts with a black voting age population between 30% and 50%, and four other districts
with a black voting age population between 25% and 30%. Id. This was an increase from
the 1997 plan, which featured ten Senate districts with a majority-black voting age popula-
tion, and eight Senate districts with a black voting age population between 30% and 50%.
Id.
5. Id. at 2506.
6. Id. at 2506-07.
7. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2002). Under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act the state has the option of applying for administrative preclearance through the
Attorney General of the United States, or by instituting an action in district court.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2507.
8. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2507. The state submitted evidence of the total population,
total black population, the black voting age population, percentage of black registered vot-
ers, and the overall percentage of Democratic voters residing in each district. Id. It also
submitted testimony from people involved in enacting the Senate plan, and United States
Congressman John Lewis of Atlanta, showing the plan's purpose was to ensure a Democ-
ratic majority in the Senate. Id. Evidence was also presented with respect to three pro-
posed Senate districts objected to by the United States, and two districts challenged by
intervenors. Id.
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to elect candidates of their choosing.9 It recognized that a limited
percentage of whites would vote for a black candidate, but main-
tained that percentage was not high enough for black voters to
elect a candidate of their choosing.' ° The district court stated that
the evidence presented by the United States focused on only three
contested districts in the State Senate plan, and was not designed
to assess its overall impact." Four African-American citizens of
Georgia were permitted to intervene, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24,12 identifying two other districts where retro-
gression was alleged to occur." A three-judge panel of the district
court refused to grant preclearance to Georgia's State Senate re-
districting plan, holding that it violated Section 5.14 The dissent-
ing opinion of Judge Oberdorfer would have given more weight to
the evidence presented by the proponents of the State Senate
9. Id. The United States noted that the black voting age population in District 2
dropped from 60.58% to 50.31%, in District 12 from 55.43% to 50.66%, and in District 26
from 62.45% to 50.80%. Id. The percentage of black registered voters dropped to just un-
der 50% in all three of these districts, and the government provided evidence that voting is
racially polarized in all of them. Id. at 2508.
10. Id. at 2508. The United States offered testimony from witnesses residing in Dis-
tricts 2, 12, and 26 who claimed that the new boundaries of these districts would reduce the
ability of blacks to elect their candidate of choice. Id. Testimony was also offered from the
only black Senator who voted against the plan, Senator Regina Thompson, the Republican
leader of the Senate, Senator Eric Johnson, and black legislators who voted for the plan but
were concerned as to how the plan would impact black voters. Id.
11. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). This rule provides that a party may be permitted to intervene
in an action when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to inter-
vene, or when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and the disposition of the action affects the applicant's interest.
Id.
13. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2508. The intervenors challenged all three plans proposed by
the state, but provided little evidence beyond proposals for alternate plans and an expert
report criticizing the state's expert in support of their position. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at
37.
14. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 97. Judge Sullivan authored the majority opinion,
joined by Judge Edwards, stating that Georgia had "not demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the State Senate redistricting plan would not have a retrogressive
effect on African American voters" effective exercise of the electoral franchise. Id. The
court found that Districts 2, 12, and 26 were retrogressive because there was a lesser
chance than under the previous plan for the black candidate of choice to win election due to
the reduction in black voter age population in those districts. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at
93-94. The Court also held that Georgia failed to present any evidence that this retrogres-
sion would be offset by gains in other districts. Id. at 88. Judge Edwards, joined by Judge
Sullivan, concurred in an opinion stressing that § 5 and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act are
procedurally and substantively distinct provisions, thus rejecting Georgia's contention "that
a plan preserving an equal opportunity for minorities to elect candidates of their choice
satisfies § 5." Id. at 97, 101-02. He also rejected the testimony of the black Georgia politi-
cians who supported the plan, thinking that it did not address whether racial polarization
was present in the contested districts. Id. at 101-02.
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plan." After preclearance was denied, the Georgia General As-
sembly received preclearance for another redistricting plan simi-
lar to the one in this litigation, except it added black voters to the
disputed districts. 6
Because a three-judge district court panel handed down this rul-
ing, the appeal went directly to the Supreme Court, which vacated
the judgment below and remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion. 7 In deciding this appeal, the Supreme Court
first addressed whether the district court erred by allowing the
intervention of private litigants in this lawsuit.'8 The Court de-
termined that the district court properly found that intervention
was allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, and that
the intervenors would be impacted by the redistricting plan. 9
Moving to the merits of the case, the Court stated that the district
court failed to consider all of the relevant factors related to the
retrogression of black voters' ability to effectively elect members to
the Georgia Senate. In making this determination, the Court
analyzed the issue of whether a plan that would satisfy Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act should be precleared under Section 5.21
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor stated that the Court
has "consistently understood" Section 2 to "combat different evils
and, accordingly, to impose very different duties upon the
15. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting). Judge Oberdorfer's
reason for supporting the Senate plan was as follows:
However, with respect to the state Senate redistricting plan, I give greater credence
to the political expertise and motivation of Georgia's African-American political lead-
ers and reasonable inferences drawn from their testimony and the voting data and
statistics than to what I find to be flawed opinions of experts and conflicting lay wit-
ness testimony presented by the Department of Justice and intervenors.
Id. He noted that the Supreme Court had not yet determined whether preclearance should
be granted for a redistricting plan preserving or increasing the number of districts state-
wide where minorities have a fair or reasonable chance to elect candidates of their choos-
ing, or whether every district must remain at or improve on their benchmark probability of
victory, even if the result is minority super-majorities exceeding the level required to en-
sure victory. Id. at 117.
16. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 204 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2002). The holding of that case is not
in dispute in this appeal. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2509.
17. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517. Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order in an action required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district
court of three judges. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2003).
18. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2509. Georgia maintained that private parties should not be
allowed to intervene in § 5 actions due to their political motives. Id. § 5 does not limit the
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a preclearance case, allowing private
parties to intervene. Id.
19. Id. at 2509-10.
20. Id. at 2514.
21. Id. at 2510.
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States."22 She declared that Section 2 applies to all states, while
Section 5 is limited to particular covered jurisdictions, resulting inS 23
a different method of inquiry between the two sections. In a pre-
vious holding, the Court determined that a violation of Section 2 is
not an independent reason to deny preclearance under Section 5.24
One of Georgia's arguments in support of its redistricting plan
was that compliance with Section 2 suffices for preclearance under
Section 5.25 Instead, the Court stated that Georgia must prove
that its plan is nonretrogressive under Section 5.2 The state fur-
ther argued that even if compliance with Section 2 does not qual-
ify under Section 5, its State Senate plan should be precleared
because it would not diminish a minority voter's exercise of the
electoral franchise. 27  The Court then examined the meaning of
what constitutes the effective exercise of the electoral franchise,
determining that the inquiry must evaluate the entire statewide
plan as a whole.2" A second phase of the analysis employed by the
Court required an examination of all the relevant circumstances
that factor into an assessment of a retrogressive effect.29  When
22. Id. (quoting Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477 (1997) (Bossier Par-
ish I)).
23. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2510. The essence of a § 2 vote dilution claim is that a cer-
tain electoral law, practice or structure causes an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect the candidates of their choice. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2510
(quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)). By contrast, a retrogression inquiry
under § 5 requires a comparison of a jurisdiction's new voting plan with its existing plan.
Id. (quoting Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 478).
24. Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 477. In Bossier Parish I, the Court stated that "recog-
nizing § 2 violations as a basis for denying § 5 preclearance would inevitably make compli-
ance with § 5 contingent upon compliance with § 2." Id. This would result in § 5 standards
being replaced with § 2 standards, contradicting the Court's longstanding interpretation of
these sections. Id.
25. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2510. This was the other side of the argument made in the
Bossier Parish I case, and the Court rejected it here because they refused to equate a § 2
vote dilution inquiry with the § 5 retrogression standard. Id. The Court said that this
analysis would "shift the focus of § 5 from nonretrogression to vote dilution, and [would]
change the § 5 benchmark from a jurisdiction's existing plan to a hypothetical, undiluted
plan." Id. at 2510-11 (quoting Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 480).
26. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511.
27. Id.
28. Id. Justice O'Connor stated:
Thus, while the diminution of a minority group's effective exercise of the electoral
franchise in one or two districts may be sufficient to show a violation of § 5, it is only
sufficient if the covered jurisdiction cannot show that the gains in the plan as a whole
offset the loss in a particular district.
Id.
29. Id. Some factors to be considered include "the ability of the minority to elect their
candidate of choice, the extent of the minority's opportunity to participate in the political
process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive plan." Id.
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reviewing these circumstances, the majority stated that the com-
parative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of its
choice should not be the sole focus. 0
Justice O'Connor went on to discuss the method of determining
the ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice.31
She stated that this might be done by a state creating a certain
number of "safe districts," where it is highly likely that minority
voters will be able to elect their favored candidate." The majority
also said the state may choose to create a larger number of dis-
tricts where it is likely that minority voters will be able to elect
candidates of their choosing, although the likelihood of election of
a minority candidate may not be as great as it was under the
benchmark plan.33 However, the Court explained that Section 5
does not dictate that a state must choose one of these redistricting
methods over another.34 After analyzing all of the factors to be
considered, Justice O'Connor determined that Section 5 gives the
states the flexibility to choose one theory over the other.35
In the Court's view, another highly relevant factor in a retro-
gression inquiry is the extent that a new plan might change the
minority group's opportunity to participate in the political proc-
ess.36  Employing such an analysis, Justice O'Connor explained
that this requires the Court to examine whether a new plan adds
or subtracts "influence districts" where minorities can play a sub-
30. Id. "While this factor is an important one in the § 5 retrogression inquiry, it cannot
be dispositive or exclusive." Id. The standard to be employed in § 5 is whether the new
plan "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Id. (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).
31. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The Court cited its opinion in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), stating
either option "will present the minority group its own array of electoral risks and benefits,"
and presents "hard choices about what would truly 'maximize' minority electoral success."
Id. at 2511-12 (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
While the creation of a small number of safe majority-minority districts may virtually
guarantee the election of their chosen candidate in those districts, such a plan runs the risk
of isolating minority voters from the rest of the state and narrowing their political influ-
ence. Id. at 2512. This may result in the representative of a particular district mirroring
the race of the voters who live there, however, the number of such representatives across
the state may be limited to fewer districts. Id. The Court further stated that spreading
minority votes across a greater number of districts might increase the number of districts
where minority voters could elect a candidate of their choice, and create coalitions of voters
who will help to achieve the electoral aspirations of the minority group. Id.
35. Id. at 2512.
36. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2512.
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stantial role in the election of candidates." She further stated
that an important factor considered in evaluating the weight of
these districts is the willingness of candidates to take the minor-
ity's interests into account if elected without decisive minority
support." Justice O'Connor declared that Section 5 gives states
the discretion to choose to use "influence" and "coalitional" dis-
tricts, with the idea that it is better to risk having fewer minority
representatives in the hope of increasing the number sympathetic
to the interests of minority voters.39 In addition to these influence
districts, the Court explained that another means for assessing
retrogressive effect is "to examine the comparative position of leg-
islative leadership, influence, and power for representatives of the
benchmark majority-minority districts." A further consideration
suggested by Justice O'Connor goes to whether the representa-
tives elected from the districts protected by the Voting Rights Act
support the redistricting plan.4" The majority disagreed with the
district court, stating that this evidence is relevant to determining
retrogressive effect.42
Addressing the concerns of the dissent, the majority stated that
the ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of their choos-
ing remains an integral feature in any Section 5 analysis.43 While
the dissent asserted that a Section 5 inquiry cannot go beyond as-
sessing whether a minority group can elect a candidate of its
choice, Justice O'Connor cited the words of Justice Souter from the
37. Id. Justice O'Connor cites various studies that suggest the creation of more influ-
ence or coalitional districts might be the most effective way to maximize minority voting
strength. Id. at 2513.
38. Id. (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
39. Id. at 2513.
40. Id. The Court states that the maintaining or increasing of legislative positions of
power for minority voters' chosen representatives can be used as evidence of a lack of retro-
gressive effect. Id.
41. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2513. The district court stated that support of legislators
from benchmark majority-minority districts may show a lack of retrogressive purpose, but
it is not relevant in assessing retrogressive effect. Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
42. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2513. The Court recognized that representatives of districts
created to protect minority interests possess knowledge of how their voters will probably
act, and whether or not the changes will decrease their ability to exercise their electoral
franchise. Id.
43. Id. at 2513-14. Assessing a plan with coalitional districts is subject to the same
retrogression analysis as one with influence and coalitional districts. Id. Evidence of racial
polarization is a relevant factor considered in assessing whether a minority group is able to
elect its chosen candidate or exert significant influence in the voting process. Id. at 2514.
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majority opinion in Johnson v. DeGrandy,44 recognizing the impor-
tance of considering this factor in assessing a Section 2 vote-
dilution inquiry.45 The Court decided that in evaluating the differ-
ences between a new districting plan and the benchmark, the
same standard should apply to Section 5 situations."
In making its ruling, Justice O'Connor declared that the district
court failed to consider all of the relevant factors in examining
whether retrogression occurred under Georgia's Senate plan."7
The majority held that the district court focused too heavily on the
proposed Senate Districts 2, 12, and 26, failing to examine the in-
creases in black voting age population that occurred in the other
districts. 8 According to Justice O'Connor, the district court also
failed to explore in depth any other factor beyond the comparative
ability of black voters to elect the candidate of their choice in the
majority-minority districts, ignoring the support of legislators
from those districts. 49 While the changes made in the disputed
districts made the likelihood of electing a minority supported can-
didate marginally less possible, the majority ruled that the district
court's inquiry was too narrow in the face of the evidence pre-
sented, and the Senate plan as a whole was not retrogressive.0
Using figures generated by the 2000 census, Justice O'Connor de-
termined that Georgia had sufficiently offset the losses in the dis-
puted districts by overall gains statewide, satisfying the require-
ments of Section 5.51 The Court analyzed further data that dem-
onstrated the ability of minority voters to exert influence in the
districts where they do not have a majority.52 As a result, the
Court determined that the district court did not engage in the cor-
rect retrogression analysis, focusing too heavily on the ability of
44. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). "[T]he 'extent of the opportunities minority voters enjoy to
participate in the political process' is an important factor to consider in assessing a § 2 vote-
dilution inquiry." Id. at 1011-12.





50. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2515.
51. Id. at 2515-16. Under those figures, the number of districts with a majority-
minority voting age population increases from ten to thirteen, and the number of districts
with a black voting age population between 30% and 50% increases from eight to thirteen.
Id. This confirmed the state's goal of unpacking minority voters from heavily dominated
districts to increase their influence across the state. Id.
52. Id. Almost all of the thirty-four districts where the black voting age population is
greater than 20% have a percentage of Democratic voters greater than 50% overall. Id.
952 Vol. 42
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minority voters to elect candidates in majority-minority districts.53
The majority closed its opinion by stating that the purpose of the
Voting Rights Act is to prevent discrimination in the exercise of
the voting franchise and to foster a transformation to a society
that is no longer fixated on race.' The Supreme Court remanded
the case to the district court to reweigh the record in light of their
explanation of retrogression.55
Concurring with the majority, Justice Kennedy agreed that race
was a predominant factor in the creation of Georgia's State Senate
district plan.56 However, he saw a potential inconsistency between
Section 2 and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act resulting in con-
duct that might violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment. He stated that the basis of this argument is that
the Department of Justice is permitted or directed to ratify a
course of unconstitutional conduct in order to comply with the
statute.58
Justice Thomas filed a very brief concurring opinion, reasserting
his adherence to the views expressed in his concurring opinion in
Holder v. Hall,59 but joining the Court's opinion because it is con-
sistent with prior Section 5 precedents."
Writing for the dissent, Justice Souter agreed that reducing the
number of majority-minority districts within a state would not
necessarily amount to retrogression under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965." However, he explained that before a state is
53. Id. at 2516.
54. Id. at 2517. The Court quotes the testimony of Congressman Lewis, who stated: "I
think that's what the [civil rights] struggle was all about, to create what I like to call a
truly interracial democracy in the South." Id.
55. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517.
56. Id.
57. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy believes
that if the Court's statement of the facts of this case had been written as the preface to an
Equal Protection Clause challenge, or under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it would
succeed. Id.
58. Id.
59. 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994). In a lengthy concurring opinion, Justice Thomas traced
the history of the Court's jurisprudence under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and expressed
great displeasure with the way the Court has interpreted the act. Holder, 512 U.S. at 891
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
60. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517-18 (Thomas, J., concurring).
61. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated:
The prudential objective of § 5 is hardly betrayed if a state can show that a new dis-
tricting plan shifts from supermajority districts, in which minorities can elect their
candidates of choice by their own voting power, to coalition districts, in which minori-




allowed to shift from majority-minority to coalition districts, it
bears the burden of proving that nonminority voters will vote re-
liably along with the minority." Justice Souter stated that if the
state's evidence does not convince the factfinder that high racial
polarization in voting is unlikely, or that high white crossover vot-
ing is likely, a reduction of supermajority districts must be treated
as retrogressive.63 As a result, the dissent held that the district
court did not err, and the majority mistakes the significance of the
evidence supporting their decision.'
Justice Souter criticized the Court's decision that a potentially
retrogressive redistricting plan could satisfy the requirements of
Section 5 if a sufficient number of influence and coalition districts
were created, or if the new plan provided minority groups the
chance to elect a particularly powerful candidate. 5 He further
disagreed with the notion that a state could carry its burden to
show a nonretrogressive degree of minority influence by demon-
strating that candidates elected without their support would be
willing to take the minority's interest into account." In his view,
prior rulings of the Court held that a state must show a lack of
retrogression in any change in voting procedure, meaning it must
not leave minority voters with less chance to effectively elect pre-
ferred candidates than before the change. This, he asserted, is
contrary to the Court's view that influence may be adequate to
avoid retrogression from majority-minority districts when it re-
flects a willingness on the part of politicians to consider minority
interests when they do not require minority support to be
elected. 8 Justice Souter further questioned the majority's view
due to the lack of a clear standard in evaluating how this influ-
ence should be measured and applied.69
Another source of contention with the dissent was the notion
that a state may trade minority voters' ability to elect a candidate
62. Id.




66. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2519 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 100 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgement)).
67. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2519 (Souter, J., dissenting), "[Tihe purpose of § 5 has al-
ways been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise." Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.




of their choice for the ability to influence the selection of a position
of legislative power.7" In the dissent's view, this may result in the
state valuing minority votes in a district in which a potential
committee chairman might be elected differently from a district
with ordinary candidates. 1 Justice Souter found it impossible to
believe that Congress intended Section 5 preclearance to turn on
such distinctions, and theorized on the possible outcome of em-
ploying such analysis.72
According to the dissent, the district court never reached the is-
sue of what type of influence districts would be required to offset a
decrease in majority-minority districts, because it found the state
had not shown the possibility of actual coalitions that would allow
such a change without retrogressive effect. 3 As a result, he be-
lieved that the Supreme Court should not be making a decision on
this issue under the clear error standard that it is to employ, and
should not disturb the lower court's ruling because they would
have decided it differently. 4
Reviewing the district court's analysis of the facts, Justice
Souter stated that the majority acknowledged that the simple fact
of a decrease in black voting age population in some districts is not
enough to prove that a redistricting plan is retrogressive. 5 He
contended that the Voting Rights Act permits states to move mi-
norities out of districts where they formerly constituted a majority
on the condition that racial divisions have healed to the point
where reductions in numbers will not lead to result in the weaken-
ing of electoral power. 6 The dissent noted that the district court
had observed if racial elements consistently vote in separate blocs,
then a decrease in the black voter age population will impact the
ability of minorities to elect the candidate of their choice." On the
facts presented, Justice Souter stated that the district court de-
termined the United States presented evidence that racial polari-
zation existed in the contested districts, while Georgia failed to
present anything relevant on the issue in dispute." In his opinion,
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2520.
72. Id.
73. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2520-21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2521.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 78).
77. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2522. The district court stated that Georgia's expert:
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the majority ignored this determination by the lower court be-
cause it was not reviewing the decision for clear error, but rather
it engaged in a review of the district court de novo.7 9
In conducting this de novo review, Justice Souter stated that the
majority ignored the fact that evidence presented on white cross-
over voting does not reflect the changes made to districts under
the proposed plan." In his view, another fault in the majority's
review of the record dealt with the reason the district court only
focused on the selected Senate districts.8 The dissent further
criticized the majority for its reliance on the testimony of state
politicians, and Georgia's reliance on the nearly unanimous sup-
port for the plan by its minority legislators, discounting the dis-
trict court's conclusion that this evidence was inadequate to carry
the state's burden.82 The majority's treatment of statistics related
to the racial composition of the districts is another area of dispute
with the dissent, which claims that the percentages in isolation
without contextual information did not indicate whether the state
carried its burden.83
Justice Souter closed his dissent by criticizing the majority's
reference to the 1990 census and redistricting plan as being ir-
relevant to the current efforts." In his view, a proper retrogres-
sion analysis must be based on the current census information,
and cannot be based on a comparison as to whether the new plan
made no attempt to address the central issue before the Court: whether the state's
proposal is retrogressive... The paucity of information in [the expert's] report leaves
us unable to use his analysis to assess the expected change in African American vot-
ing strength statewide that will be brought by the proposed Senate plan.
Id. (quoting Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 81).
79. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter pointed out that Epstein's report
was not to look at racial polarization, but rather to show whether or not blacks and whites
vote for different candidates. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that Georgia was the party who
asked that the analysis be limited to the disputed districts, and the district court refused.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). He contended that the Court did analyze the state as a whole,
and discussed the dispute between the Attorney General's and the state's determinations of
the number of majority-minority districts that would exist under the new plan. Id. (Souter,
J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2524 (Souter, J., dissenting). The district court stated: "[T]he lack of positive
racial polarization data was the gap at the center of the state's case [and] the evidence
presented by [the] estimable [legislators] does not come close to filling that void." Id. (quot-
ing Georgia, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 100) (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2524-25 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter compared the
statistics given by the majority and the changes made in the districts to show that this
evidence can be interpreted in various ways, and that they do not necessarily provide
meaningful information. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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is retrogressive in comparison to the previous one.8 The statistics
related to Georgia's Democrats were equally of doubtful relevance
in the dissent's opinion.86 In the end, Justice Souter stated the
burden to prove that no retrogression has occurred under Section
5 can only be addressed by presenting "evidence of how particular
populations of voters will probably act in the circumstances in
which they live."87 He stated that Georgia has the burden of con-
vincing on that evidence, and the district court determined that it
had not.88
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the Untied States or by any state on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."89 In order
to protect this right, Congress was given the power to enforce it
through appropriate legislation.9 ° Shortly after this amendment
was ratified, Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1870, which
made it a crime for public officers and private persons to obstruct
the exercise of the right to vote.91 The following year the statute
was amended, providing for detailed federal supervision of the
electoral process.92 However, due to lack of enforcement, most of
the Act's provisions were repealed in 1894."3 Beginning in 1890,
the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia began to enact tests spe-
cifically for the purpose of preventing blacks from voting.94 Typi-
cally, voting tests took the form of literacy requirements or re-
quired completion of a registration form, while other tests permit-
85. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Court's assumption that a proper § 5 analysis may proceed on the basis of obso-
lete data from a superseded census is thus as puzzling as it is unprecedented. It is
also an invitation to perverse results, for if a state could carry its burden under § 5
merely by showing no retrogression from the state of affairs 13 years ago, it could
demand preclearance for a plan flatly diminishing minority voting strength under §
5.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter analyzed the statistics related to the
percentages of Democratic voters by district and statewide, and determined that these
numbers do not provide any meaningful data as to how people will actually vote. Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2526 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2526 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. U.S CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
90. U.S CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
91. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966).
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ted whites to vote.95 A series of Supreme Court decisions invali-
dated these tests one by one, finding that each test was adminis-
tered differently depending on the race of the prospective voter.96
In the 1950's, Congress began to try to deal with voting dis-
crimination by facilitating case-by-case litigation.97 The Civil
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 attempted to end racial discrimina-
tion in voting in the above-named states.98 Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 expedited the hearing of voting rights cases
before three-judge courts and outlawed discriminatory tactics that
had been used to keep blacks from voting in federal elections.99
These laws, however, had little impact on the problem of voter
discrimination. ' ° Litigation to correct racial discrimination in vot-
ing had proved ineffective due to the amount of preparation re-
quired, and the opportunities for voting officials to delay the pro-
ceedings. 101 Even when litigation on these issues succeeded, some
of the states would change to other discriminatory methods not
covered by the federal decrees, or in the alternative, local officials
would defy or evade the court orders.' Other tactics included the
closing of registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.' 3
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was created out of Congress' firm
intention to rid the nation of racial discrimination in voting."
Section 5 of the act instituted a suspension of new voting regula-
tions, as well as a requirement that any subsequent regulations be
approved by the Attorney General or, in the alternative, by a
three-judge district court panel, which could be appealed directly
95. Id. at 310-11. More than two-thirds of the adult blacks in the named states were
illiterate in 1890, in contrast to less that one-quarter of the adult whites. Id. Alternate
tests were created to insure that illiterate whites would be permitted to vote, including
grandfather clauses, property qualifications, "good character tests," and the requirement
that registrants "understand" or "interpret" certain matter. Id. at 311.
96. Id. at 311-12.
97. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313.
98. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized injunctive relief against public and
private interference with the right to vote on the basis of race, while the Civil Rights Act of
1960 allowed the joinder of states as defendants and gave the federal government more
control over voting in areas of systematic discrimination. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. According to estimates by the Attorney General, during hearings on the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, registration of voting age blacks between 1958 and 1964 in Alabama
only rose from 14.2% to 19.4%. Id. The increases in other southern states during this
period were even smaller. Id. Registration of voting age whites in these states was ap-
proximately 50% higher by comparison. Id.
101. Id. at 314.
102. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 315.
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to the U.S. Supreme Court."°5 This procedure was in response to
the common state practice of passing new discriminatory voting
laws as soon as the Court invalidated the prior ones. The meas-
ures employed by this act were motivated by what Congress
viewed as "an insidious and pervasive evil which had been per-
petuated through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Con-
stitution."' 7 Furthermore, Congress determined that sterner and
more elaborate measures would be necessary to satisfy the dic-
tates of the Fifteenth Amendment.' °s In the latter half of 1965, the
aforementioned states were brought under the coverage of the act
and required to submit to its demands.' 9
In January 1966, South Carolina filed a bill in equity for deter-
mination of validity of selected provisions of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.110 It contended that the Act violated the United States
Constitution, and asked for an injunction against enforcement of
the selected provisions by the Attorney General. 1' The Court rec-
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000). This section allows for any qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure to become effective if the Attorney General has not ob-
jected to it within sixty days of its submission, or indicates that no objection will be made.
Id. This provision does not bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of the plan and
the Attorney General may reserve the right to re-examine the submission despite affirma-
tively indicating that no objection will be made during the sixty-day period following re-
ceipt. Id.
106. Beer, 425 U.S. at 140 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.94-196, at 57-58 (1965)). This section
explains Congress' intent in creating § 5 as follows:
Section 5 was a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one
step ahead of the federal courts by passing discriminatory voting laws as soon as the
old ones had been struck down. That practice has been possible because each new
law remained in effect until the Justice Department or private plaintiffs were able to
sustain the burden of proving that the new law, too, was discriminatory .... Con-
gress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could, "to shift the advantage of
time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim." By freezing election
procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscrimi-
natory.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310. See also H.R. REP. NO. 439, at 8-16 (1965) and S.
REP. NO. 162, pt. 3, at 3-16 (1965).
108. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310.
109. Id. at 318. A state, or any separate political subdivision falls under the remedial
sections of the act if two findings have been made: (1) the Attorney General has determined
that on November 1, 1964, it maintained a "test or device," and (2) the Director of the Cen-
sus has determined that less than 50% of its voting age residents were registered on No-
vember 1, 1964, or voted in the 1964 presidential election. Id. at 317. On August 7, 1965,
South Carolina, Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, 26 counties in
North Carolina, and one county in Arizona were brought under the Act. Id. at 318.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 307. The Court noted that original jurisdiction for this action was founded on
the presence of a controversy between a state and a citizen of another state. Id. (citing U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2).
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ognized that the questions presented were of "urgent concern" for
the entire country and allowed all of the states to participate as
friends of the Court."2 The primary challenge asserted by South
Carolina was that the provisions of the Act exceeded the powers of
Congress, thereby encroaching on an area reserved to the states
by the Constitution."3 The challenges particular to Section 5 al-
leged that the review of the voting rules infringed upon Article III
of the Constitution by directing the district court to issue advisory
opinions, and that the act abridged due process by limiting litiga-
tion to a distant forum."
4
In making its ruling in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court
explained that the Fifteenth Amendment has always been treated
as self executing and as invalidating state voting qualifications or
procedures that are discriminatory on their face or in practice.15
In addition, the Court held the provision in Section 2 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enact legislation
appropriate to enforce it. 1'6 The Court used this provision to sup-
port its rejection of South Carolina's argument, that Congress may
not take affirmative action to create remedies to Fifteenth
Amendment violations and may only address general violations of
that amendment.'17 Addressing the provisions of Section 5 of the
Act, Chief Justice Warren recognized this was an uncommon exer-
cise of Congressional power, but one made necessary by its knowl-
edge that the covered states might attempt to evade the remedies
it created for voting discrimination."' He dismissed the notion
that this section required the Court to issue an advisory opinion."9
Because the Act suspended the operation of voting regulations
enacted after November 1, 1964, the Chief Justice determined that
it created an immediate controversy with the federal government
if the state wished to make any change.
2
1
112. Id. at 307. The states supporting South Carolina were Alabama, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, and Virginia. Id. The states supporting the Attorney General were California, Illi-
nois, and Massachusetts, joined by Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 307-08.
113. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 325.
116. Id. at 326.
117. Id. at 327.
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Having determined that the act was constitutional, in Allen v.
State Board of Elections,12 the Court took the next step to deter-
mine whether various state enactments were subject to the re-
quirements of the Act. 12 2 In Allen, the Court dealt with four cases
involving the application of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.12 In
each case, the states enacted new laws or issued new regulations
and sought to determine if these fell under the auspices of Section
5.24 The district court in each instance subsequently dismissed
the complaint. 5 Before the Court was able to address the sub-
stantive issues presented by these cases, it had to determine
whether a private individual had standing to bring an action un-
der the Act, or whether such standing was reserved solely for the
Attorney General.'26 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice War-
ren declared that it was "consistent with the broad purpose of the
Act to allow the individual citizen standing to insure that his city
or county government complies with the Section 5 approval re-
quirements."27
Turning to the substantive issues of the case, the majority ad-
dressed the question of what type of actions taken by state or local
governments were covered by Section 5.12 Among the issues in
121. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
122. Allen, 393 U.S. at 548.
123. Id. at 547-48. This case represented the consolidation of three cases from Missis-
sippi, and one from Virginia, all dealing with related issues. Id.
124. Id. at 550-53.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 554-55. Chief Justice Warren stated:
The Voting Rights Act does not explicitly grant or deny private parties authorization
to seek a declaratory judgment that a state has failed to comply with the provisions
of the Act. However, § 5 does provide that "no person shall be denied the right to vote
for failure to comply with (a new state enactment covered by, but not approved under
§ 5)." Analysis of this language in light of the major purpose of the Act indicates that
appellants may seek a declaratory judgment that a new state enactment is governed
by § 5. Further, after proving that the state has failed to submit the covered enact-
ment for § 5 approval, the private party has standing to obtain an injunction against
further enforcement, pending the state's submission of the legislation pursuant to §
5.
Id. (citations omitted).
127. Allen, 393 U.S. at 557. Other jurisdictional matters dealt with by the Court in-
cluded whether or not a private plaintiff must bring suit on § 5 in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, and whether Congress intended disputes arising under § 5 must be
heard by a three-judge panel. Id. at 557-63. The Court determined requiring a private
litigant to bring suit only in the District of Columbia might impose such a burden as to
preclude him from bringing suit. Id. at 560. In regard to the use of three-judge panels to
hear these suits, the Court held because of the potential clash between state and federal
power, Congress intended disputes involving the coverage of § 5 be determined by a district
court of three judges. Id.
128. Id. at 563.
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dispute was whether a change from district to at-large voting
would fall under Section 5, as it would cause a conflict in the ad-
ministration of reapportionment legislation. 129 In the Mississippi
cases, the state contended that under a broad reading of Section 5,
enforcement of a reapportionment plan could be enjoined for fail-
ure to meet the approval requirements, even though a federal
court had approved the plan.3 ° Chief Justice Warren dismissed
the narrow construction that the states would have given Section
5, explaining that the Voting Rights Act was aimed at both the
subtle and obvious regulations which had the effect of denying
citizens the right to vote on the basis of race. 3' After an extensive
review of the Act's legislative history, the Court determined that it
was within the intent of Congress to cover all of the enactments at
issue in the cases under the umbrella of Section 5.132 The Court
also held that it was not sufficient as a submission when the At-
torney General did not object to the enforcement of the enact-
ments after becoming aware of their existence.'33 The Court held
that it was now necessary for the states to submit any "legislation
or regulation in question directly to the Attorney General with a
request for his consideration pursuant to the Act."
134
With the decision in Allen regarding what type of enactments
came under the control of Section 5, in Georgia v. United States,
15
the Court faced the issue of whether the reapportionment of vot-
ing districts was also covered. 13' Following the 1970 census, Geor-
gia submitted a plan to the Attorney General to reapportion its
legislative districts. 37 After receiving the plan, a representative of
the Department of Justice requested further information to be
used in its evaluation."3 Once the plan was reviewed, the Justice
Department rejected it on the basis that it was unable to conclude
129. Id. at 564.
130. Id. at 565.
131. Id. at 565.
132. Allen, 393 U.S. at 570-71.
133. Id. at 571. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated:
While the Attorney General has not required any formal procedure, we do not think
the Act contemplates that a 'submission' occurs when the Attorney General merely
becomes aware of the legislation, no matter in what manner. Nor do we think the
service of the briefs on the Attorney General constituted a 'submission.'
Id.
134. Id.
135. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
136. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 526.
137. Id. at 528.
138. Id. at 529.
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that the plan did not have a discriminatory racial effect on vot-
ing.'39 The state enacted another plan in 1972, but the Attorney
General failed to grant preclearance on the basis that it did not
sufficiently fix the defects found in the previous plan." ° The At-
torney General initiated a lawsuit when the Georgia Legislature
decided it would make no further effort to present a new plan, and
responded to the suit by claiming Section 5 did not reach the re-
apportionment of voting districts."'
Speaking for the majority, Justice Stewart stated that the prior
decisions of the Court compelled the conclusion that Section 5 gov-
erned changes to voting districts like those being made under
Georgia's 1972 House reapportionment plan.4 2 The Court based
its ruling on the determination of the reach of Section 5 estab-
lished in Allen, and by the fact that subsequent changes made by
Congress to the Voting Rights Act did not disturb the decision in
that ruling."3 Also considered by the Court was the practice of the
covered states, including Georgia, which had been submitting
their redistricting plans to the Attorney General for approval since
the Allen decision.'" Because the potential for diluting the value
of the minority vote existed through the process of reapportion-
ment, the Court determined the district court was correct in decid-
ing that the changes made by Georgia in its House of Representa-
tives plan fell under the control of Section 5.45 In addition, the
Court approved a series of regulations promulgated by the Attor-
ney General's office to govern the procedure for submission of
plans for approval, further reinforcing the notion that preclear-
ance of redistricting plans was required under Section 546
139. Id. at 530. The Attorney General objected to the plan because of its use of "multi-
member districts, numbered posts, majority runoff elections, and the extensive departure
from the state's prior policy of adhering to county lines." Id.
140. Id. at 530.
141. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 531.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 533. The Court noted that during the deliberations to extend the Voting
Rights Act the Allen decision was repeatedly discussed, yet § 5 was not modified in any
substantive way. Id.
144. Id. at 533-34.
145. Id. at 534-35.
146. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 536-41. The state argued that the Attorney General had
granted himself more time than the statute provided to evaluate plans through the use of
regulations. Id. While the statute is silent on the authority of the Attorney General to
promulgate regulations, it is also silent on the procedures he may employ in deciding
whether or not to object to state submissions. Id. at 536. The Court reasoned that if these
regulations are reasonable and do not conflict with the Act itself, then the Attorney General
Summer 2004 963
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Given the Court's decision in Georgia v. United States that Sec-
tion 5 applied to legislative redistricting, in Beer v. United
States, 7 the Court had to determine how the Georgia holding was
to be applied in practice 8  In Beer, the City of New Orleans
brought suit under Section 5 seeking a judgment declaring that a
reapportionment of its council districts did not have the purpose
or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the basis of
color. 91 4  After receipt of the 1970 census, the city council adopted a
redistricting plan that preserved the basic north-to-south pattern
of the 1960 redistricting plan, which predated the adoption of Sec-
tion 5.15 Under this plan, blacks constituted a majority of the
population in two districts, but did not make up a majority of the
registered voters in any district.' This plan, called Plan I by the
Court, was rejected by the Attorney General because it had the
effect of diluting black voting strength by combining black voters
with a greater number of white voters in all of the districts."2 A
second plan, called Plan II, was created following the general
north-to-south pattern of the prior plan, but included two districts
with a majority-minority population and one with a majority black
voter population."' The Attorney General objected to this plan on
the same basis as Plan I, noting that the predominately black
neighborhoods ran in an east-to-west progression, and the north-
to-south districts would have the effect of diluting the maximum
potential impact of the black vote." The district court agreed
with the Attorney General, concluding that Plan II would have the
effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."'
In reversing the district court, Justice Stewart declared that the
purpose of Section 5 had always been to insure that no changes
would be made that would lead to "a retrogression in the position
had the authority as head of an Executive department to create regulations for his depart-
ment. Id.
147. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
148. Beer, 425 U.S. at 130.
149. Id. at 133.
150. Id. at 135.
151. Id. at 134-35. The population of New Orleans was approximately 600,000 people,
55% being white and 45% black. Id. Approximately 65% of the registered voters were
white, while only 35% were black. Id. The municipal charter provided that the city council
would consist of seven members, one elected from each of five districts, with two elected at
large. Id. The largest percentage of black voters in a single district under Plan I was
45.2%. Id. at 135.
152. Id. at 135.
153. Beer, 425 U.S. at 136.




of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise."'56 The majority concluded that retrogression
could not be found under Plan II because the arrangement of the
districts created the potential for the election of a minority candi-
date in two of the five districts, and as a result, the district court
erred in failing to approve the plan.'57 This view was opposed by
Justice Marshall, who believed the purpose of Section 5 was to
preclude new districting plans that perpetuated discrimination,
which was not served by an inquiry into whether a proposed plan
was retrogressive.'58 In his view, a covered jurisdiction fails to
meet its burden under Section 5 if the proposed redistricting plan
underrepresents minority group members.9
The necessity of retrogression to invalidate a voting plan was
furthered by the Court's holding in City of Lockhart v. United
States.'60 The City of Lockhart, Texas, made the switch from a
general law city to a home rule charter, allowing the city to exer-
cise any power not expressly forbidden by the state.' 6' As part of
this change, the city switched from a mayor and commissioner
system of government to a mayor and city council system, but re-
tained its previous numbered post election procedure.'6 2 In 1977,
four Mexican-Americans challenged this change on the basis that
Lockhart had never obtained approval under Section 5 and sought
an injunction to prevent the City from using its new election pro-
cedures.' The District Court for the Western District of Texas
granted injunctive relief, blocking future elections until Lockhart
sought preclearance from the Attorney General who in turn ob-
jected to the voting procedure, including the numbered post sys-
tem." The city then filed suit in the District Court of the District
of Columbia for a declaratory judgment, which concluded that the
numbered posts and staggered terms each had a discriminatory
impact forbidden by Section 5.5'
156. Id. at 141.
157. Id. at 142.
158. Beer, 425 U.S. at 151-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 157-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
161. Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 127.
162. Id. The numbered post election system designates the seats by number, and each
candidate specifies what post they are running for. Id. This results in each seat being an
individual race as if it was a separate office. Id.
163. Id. at 127-28. At the time of the suit, almost 47% of Lockhart's population, but
fewer than 30% of the city's registered voters, were of Mexican-American descent. Id.
164. Id. at 129.
165. Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 130.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Powell suggested that the
proper comparison for determining retrogressive effect was to
evaluate the new plan in light of the old plan, and not as the dis-
trict court had done by excluding the practice of numbered posts.166
The Court concluded that the numbered post system had been in
effect since 1917 and, while it may have the effect of discriminat-
ing against minorities in a city where racial bloc voting predomi-
nates, this impact was no greater under the new system than the
old.'67 The Court determined that while the use of staggered terms
may also have a discriminatory effect, this did not cause any ret-
rogression in the strength of the minority vote, and minorities had
actually gained strength since the adoption of the new plan.'
Once again Justice Marshall voiced his dissent that the use of a
retrogression analysis did not satisfy the dictates of Section 5,
stating that the purpose of the section includes forbidding pre-
clearance to plans that perpetuate discrimination. 9
Section 5 has also been held to prevent the construction of ir-
regularly shaped voting districts, solely created for the purpose of
insuring minority victory in election. 7 ° After the 1990 census,
North Carolina was granted a 12th seat in the United States
House of Representatives and the General Assembly enacted a
reapportionment plan that included one majority-minority con-
gressional district. 7' The Attorney General refused to grant pre-
clearance to the plan because it failed to take advantage of poten-
tial gains in minority influence that would have resulted in the
creation of a second majority-minority district. 72 A second plan
was created, this time with a second majority-minority district,
both of which were unusually shaped to maximize their minority
content.'73 This plan was approved by the Attorney General, but
was objected to by citizens of the state who brought suit in federal
166. Id. at 132-33.
167. Id. at 134-35.
168. Id. at 135-136. The evidence discussed by the Court showed that since 1973 the
Mexican-American voter turn out had increased from the levels of the prior system, and in
1978 a Mexican-American candidate was elected in Lockhart for the first time in the City's
history. Id.
169. Id. at 136-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
171. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633.
172. Id. at 634-35.
173. Id. at 635-36.
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district court, alleging an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and
a violation of the concept of "one person, one vote."' 7
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the
North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment
plan so irrational on its face that it could only be understood as an
effort to segregate voters on the basis of race, and therefore was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.17 5 In making this ruling, the Court explained that a reap-
portionment plan that included in one district those of the same
race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographic and
political boundaries, bears an "uncomfortable resemblance to po-
litical apartheid."'76 In her view, a redistricting plan such as this
would have the effect of causing elected officials to believe their
primary obligation is to represent the majority group, rather than
all the individuals who live in the district.'77 As a result, the Court
allowed the plaintiff to challenge the reapportionment plan on
Equal Protection grounds because the legislation separated voters
into districts based on race without any other rational explana-
tion.
7 8
The rationale employed in Shaw was once again applied in
Miller v. Johnson,'9 a case involving the reapportionment of Geor-
gia's United States Congressional Districts.'° In Miller, Georgia
was granted an additional Congressional seat after the 1990 cen-
sus, and created a plan that featured an increase from one major-
ity-minority district to two, and a third with a black voter age
population of 35%."' The Attorney General's office refused pre-
clearance on the ground that the plan only created two majority-
minority districts and did not recognize certain minority popula-
174. Id. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). A previous suit brought on the
theory of an unconstitutional political gerrymander by the same parties was dismissed. Id.
See also Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992). The appellants in Shaw con-
tended that the General Assembly created two Congressional Districts in which a majority
of black voters was concentrated without regard to other factors for the purpose of insuring
the election of two black representatives to Congress. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 637. The three-
judge district court granted a motion to dismiss and the Supreme Court heard the appeal.
Id. at 637-38.
175. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658.
176. Id. at 647. The Court reasoned that this segregation reinforces the perception that
members of the same racial group, regardless of their differences, will prefer the same
candidates at the polls. Id.
177. Id. at 648.
178. Id. at 649.
179. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
180. Miller, 515 U.S. at 900.
181. Id. at 906.
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tions by putting them in a majority black district.182 A second plan
was submitted that increased the black population in several dis-
tricts, but was again rejected by the Justice Department because
it did not reflect the possibility of a third majority district found in
another proposed plan."8 The Justice Department concluded that
by refusing to enact this plan into law, Georgia had failed to ade-
quately explain its failure to create a third majority-minority dis-
trict." The General Assembly created yet a third plan, which cre-
ated an unusually shaped third majority-minority district, the
Eleventh District, and was finally granted preclearance by the
Attorney General.'85
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed
the holding in Shaw and upheld the ruling of the district court
finding that race was the predominate factor in drawing the Elev-
enth District .' The majority also agreed with that Court's finding
that the Justice Department had adopted a "black-maximization"
policy under Section 5, and that it was clear from the objection
letters sent to the state that its redistricting plan would not be
approved unless a third majority-minority district was created.
18 7
Justice Kennedy declared that the creation of the Eleventh Dis-
trict was not required under the Act because there was no reason-
able basis to believe that Georgia's earlier enacted plans violated
Section 5.18 By using Section 5 to require states to create major-
ity-minority districts wherever possible, the Court held that the
Justice Department exceeded its authority under the statute, and
182. Id. at 907.
183. Id. One of the alternate plans the Attorney General relied on was called the "max-
black" plan, which was drafted by the American Civil Liberties Union. Id. This plan re-
sulted in an unusually shaped district connecting areas of dense population in a corridor
running from Macon to Savannah. Id.
184. Id. at 907.
185. Miller, 515 U.S. at 908. During the 1992 elections, black candidates were elected in
all three majority-minority districts. Id. at 909. In 1994, five white voters from the unusu-
ally shaped 11th district filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia alleging that their district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Id. A majority of the district court panel agreed with the plaintiffs, relying on the Supreme
Court's holding in Shaw by applying a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 909-10.
186. Id. at 917. The Court recognized that the trial court concluded the Attorney Gen-
eral had spent months demanding purely race-based revisions to the redistricting plans,
and Georgia spent months trying to comply. Id. at 918.
187. Id. at 921.
188. Id. at 923. Georgia's first two attempts resulted in an increase from one majority-
minority district out of ten, to two districts out of eleven, making these plans ameliorative,
and not retrogressive in violation of § 5. Id. "Ameliorative" is a term used by the Court to
describe plans increasing the number of majority-minority districts in a state. Id.
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brought the Act into conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment through race based districting.'89
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish 1),'90 the
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether preclearance must
by denied under Section 5 when a covered jurisdiction's redistrict-
ing plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'91 Af-
ter the 1990 census, the School Board for Bossier Parish, Louisi-
ana, attempted to redraw the borders of its voting districts by
adopting the same borders drawn by the Bossier Parish Police
Jury, the governing body for the parish.19 This plan had previ-
ously received preclearance by the Attorney General, leading the
School Board to believe that their plan would be precleared as
well.' 93 However, preclearance was refused because the School
Board failed to adopt a plan proposed by the local chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), which would have created two majority-minority dis-
tricts, but would also require splitting 46 voting precincts.' The
School Board filed suit in the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, which rejected the contention that an alleged failure to
satisfy Section 2 constituted an independent reason to deny pre-
clearance under Section 5.195 The district court ruled in favor of
the School Board, deciding that a court was not required to con-
sider evidence of a violation of Section 2 as evidence of discrimina-
tory purpose under Section 5.196
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor rejected the
notion that preclearance must be denied when a covered jurisdic-
tion's redistricting plan violates Section 2, stating that this view
would "call in to question more than 20 years of precedent inter-
preting Section 5. " '97 The Court held that evidence of a dilutive
189. Id. at 925-27.
190. 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
191. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 471. Section 2 bars all states and their subdivisions
from taking measures that result in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on the
basis of race or color. Id. at 479.
192. Id. at 474-75.
193. Id. at 475.
194. Id. The Attorney General's objection letter stated that the plan violated § 2 of the
Act by un-necessarily limiting the opportunity for minority voters to elect candidates of
their choosing. Id. The Justice Department relied on 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996), which
allows the Attorney General to withhold preclearance when necessary to prevent a clear
violation of § 2. Id.
195. Id. at 476.
196. Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 476.
197. Id. at 480.
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impact might be relevant when analyzing a plan for Section 5
purposes, however, that does not mean such evidence should be
considered dispositive."9 s Unable to determine whether the district
court considered evidence of the dilutive impact of the School
Board's redistricting plan, the Court vacated that aspect of the
lower court's opinion and remanded the case for a determination
of whether the plan was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
On remand, the district court held that the record did not sup-
port a conclusion that the School Board's plan contained a non-
retrogressive yet discriminatory purpose. 20 0  Hearing the appeal
(Bossier Parish II), the Supreme Court was faced with determin-
ing whether the Section 5 purpose inquiry extends beyond the
search for retrogressive intent, the question they had left open on
remand.20 ' Re-affirming the Court's decision in Bossier Parish I,
the majority refused to blur the distinction between Section 2 and
Section 5 by shifting the focus of Section 5 from non-retrogression
to vote dilution and mandating a benchmark of a hypothetical un-
diluted plan.20 2 The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice
Scalia, declared that Section 5 "prevents nothing more than back-
sliding, and preclearance under Section 5 affirms nothing but the
absence of backsliding."203  Supporting the Court's retrogression
standard announced in Beer, Justice Scalia explained that Section
5 preclearance proceedings specifically deal with changes in the
status quo, which is the baseline used to determine if the proposed
changes will lead to a retrogression.2 4 In contrast, he stated that
an analysis under Section 2 involves examining whether the
status quo abridges the right to vote, which would require com-
parison to a hypothetical alternative.2 5
198. Id. at 487. The Court observed that a jurisdiction's single decision to choose a re-
districting plan that results in a dilutive impact does not, without more, suffice to establish
that the jurisdiction acted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 914 n.6 (1996)).
199. Id. at 490. Justice O'Connor stated that the district court should apply the stan-
dard set forth in Arlington Heights, to determine whether an "individious discriminatory
purpose" was a motivating factor in the government body's decision making. Id. at 488 (See
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).
200. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 326 (2000). See Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 1998).
201. Bossier 11, 528 U.S. at 326.
202. Id. at 336.
203. Id. at 335.




Looking back on the history of the application of Section 5, and
its accompanying jurisprudence, one can see the evolution of an
Act that was intended to eradicate past injustice, but began to be
misused to serve a certain political agenda. There is no question
that this Act has had a great impact in the relationship between
the states and the federal government, and on the concept of fed-
eralism in general. The early cases like Katzenbach,
6 Allen,207
and Georgia v. United States °8 were attempts by the states to cir-
cumvent the Act, or limit its applicability. Once the Court estab-
lished the application of the law, cases like Beer..9 and City of
Lockhart"0 laid the foundation of how later controversies were to
be decided, and the form of analysis that was to be used, giving
the states a standard to be evaluated against. In later cases like
Shaw, 21' Miller,212 and Bossier Parrish I & 11,213 we see efforts by
the Justice Department to exceed the intended scope of the Act,
and use its preclearance power as a tool to force the states to ac-
cept its vision for the composition of their representation. In all
three instances, the Court has held firm to its standard of Beer,
that Section 5 dictates nothing more than the prevention of back-
sliding by the covered states.1 4
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court held true to this analysis, rec-
ognizing that great strides have been made in the effort to protect
the voting rights of formerly disenfranchised minorities. In the
nearly four decades that have passed since the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the states have moved from trying to
find ways to avoid compliance with its requirements, to creating
new ways to spread minority influence within their borders. This
truly must meet the intent of Congress when they passed this bill
into law, and should be recognized by the Justice Department
when a redistricting plan is considered for preclearance. While it
is true that marginal losses occurred in a few voting districts un-
der the 2000 redistricting plan, the state's intent was not to lessen
minority influence in those districts, rather it was to increase the
power of black voters state wide. The wide acceptance of this plan
206. See supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 134-146 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 147-159 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 170-178 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 179-189 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
214. Bossier H, 528 U.S. at 335.
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by both black and white representatives demonstrates the growth
of the state, and that improvements in race relations have been
made. The Court is now giving the states credit for their efforts
by insisting that the Justice Department look beyond the percent-
ages, and focus on the bigger picture.
Taking these improvements into consideration, one must won-
der if Section 5 has fulfilled its intended purpose, and is no longer
necessary. The section's massive intrusion on the concept of fed-
eralism has always been justified as a response to the purposeful
acts of the states in denying the voting franchise to black voters.
The states named as covered jurisdictions gained that distinction
through a history of discriminatory state action. However, cases
like Georgia v. Ashcroft point out the fact that these states have
learned from the past, and are now taking affirmative steps to
correct their past failures. In addition, the actions of the Justice
Department in cases like Shaw and Miller show that it is possible
for the federal government to abuse its power, and force its own
agenda on the states who are making legitimate efforts to meet
the dictates of the law. Failure to credit the states for their
growth in this area can only create greater tension among the po-
litical divisions of the nation, potentially fostering resentment
among the races as they try to work out an acceptable compro-
mise.
In his famous 1963 speech delivered on the steps of the Lincoln
Memorial, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. declared "I have a dream
that my four little children will one day live in a nation where
they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content
of their character."215 Four decades later, the color of skin is still
being used to divide the nation in the exercise of one of our most
fundamental rights, that of voting. It is time to begin putting
aside the focus on race as the basis of the organization of our po-
litical structure. We need to focus on what makes us all the same,
not what makes us different. The actions of the State of Georgia
in the creation of its 2000 State Senate redistricting plan show a
genuine effort in the direction of progress, and the Supreme Court
has now recognized this achievement.
Daniel L. Stants
215. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A CALL TO CONSCIENCE: THE LANDMARK SPEECHES
OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 85 (Clayborne Carson & Kris Shepard ed., Intellectual
Properties Management, Inc., In Association with Warner Books 2001).
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